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ABSTRACT: Understanding science requires appreciating the values it presupposes and its 
social context. Both the values that scientists hold and their social context can affect 
scientific communication. Philosophers of science have recently begun studying scientific 
communication, especially as it relates to public policy. Some have proposed “guiding 
principles for communicating scientific findings” to promote trust and objectivity. This 
paper contributes to this line of research in a novel way using behavioural 
experimentation. We report results from three experiments testing judgments about the 
trustworthiness, competence and objectivity of scientists. More specifically, we tested 
whether such judgments are affected by three factors: consulting or not consulting non-
scientists, conducting research under a restrictive or non-restrictive governmental 
communication policy, and the source of a lab’s funding (i.e., government funding, private 
funding, or a combination of the two). We found that each of these factors affects ordinary 
judgments of trustworthiness, competence and objectivity. These findings support several 
recommendations that could help improve scientific communication and communication 
policies.  
KEYWORDS: socially relevant philosophy of science, values in 
science, experimental philosophy 
 
Introduction 
Science communication is integral to our society and its development. Timely access 
to important scientific information can improve citizens’ decision-making and, 
therefore, their lives. Not only should citizens have access to this information, but 
they should also have the opportunity to assess it and its relevance.1 By contrast, 
limited or distorted information can degrade decision-making and cause serious 
harm, as has happened recently with renewed outbreaks of the measles and 
whooping cough in areas of North America where parents choose not to vaccinate 
                                                        
1 Elizabeth Anderson, "Uses of Value Judgments in Science: A General Argument, with Lessons 
from a Case Study of Feminist Research on Divorce," Hypatia 19, 1 (2004): 1-24. 
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their children based on inaccurate information.2 Similarly, there have been 
outbreaks of other vaccine-preventable diseases such as polio, mumps, and 
tuberculosis in other regions as the result of not vaccinating.3 According to science 
communicators, many scientists are motivated to not only discover the truth about 
their research questions, but also to share their findings with as wide an audience as 
possible and to make a positive contribution to society. Accordingly, they care about 
effective science communication because it is essential to achieving these goals.4 The 
perceived credibility of scientists is an essential part of effective science 
communication. 
Philosophers of science have recently begun studying scientific 
communication, especially as it relates to values and public policy.5 Some have 
proposed “guiding principles for communicating scientific findings” to promote trust 
and objectivity.6 Others list principles for effective citizen assessment of scientific 
information.7 This takes place in the context of a more general recent debate over 
whether science is, or should be, “value-free.”   
While value-free proponents argue that non-epistemic values have no role in 
the scientific process, many now recognize scientific practice as value-laden.8 Some 
                                                        
2 Varun K. Phadke, Robert A. Bednarczyk, Daniel A. Salmon, and Saad B. Omer, "Association 
Between Vaccine Refusal and Vaccine-Preventable Diseases in the United States: A Review of 
Measles and Pertussis," Jama 315, 11 (2016): 1149-1158. 
3 Eve Dube, Maryline Vivion, and Noni E. MacDonald, "Vaccine Hesitancy, Vaccine Refusal and 
the Anti-Vaccine Movement: Influence, Impact and Implications," Expert Review of Vaccines 14, 
1 (2015): 99-117; Saad B. Omer, Daniel A. Salmon, Walter A. Orenstein, M. Patricia Dehart, and 
Neal Halsey, "Vaccine Refusal, Mandatory Immunization, and the Risks of Vaccine-Preventable 
Diseases," New England Journal of Medicine 360, 19 (2009): 1981-1988. 
4 Anthony Dudo, "Toward a Model of Scientists' Public Communication Activity. The Case of 
Biomedical Researchers," Science Communication 35, 4 (2013): 476-501. 
5 Anderson, “Uses of Value Judgments in Science,” 1-24; Kevin Elliott and Daniel J. McKaughan, 
"Non-Epistemic Values and the Multiple Goals of Science," Philosophy of Science 81, 1 (2014): 1-
21; Kyle Powys Whyte and Robert P. Crease, "Trust, Expertise, and the Philosophy of 
Science," Synthese 177, 3 (2010): 411-425. 
6 Kevin C. Elliott and David B. Resnik, "Science, Policy, and the Transparency of 
Values," Environmental Health Perspectives 122, 7 (2014): 647-650. 
7 Anderson, “Uses of Value Judgments in Science,” 1-24; Heidi Grasswick, "Climate Change Science 
and Responsible Trust: A Situated Approach," Hypatia 29, 3 (2014): 541-557. 
8 Kevin C. Elliott, "Direct and Indirect Roles for Values in Science," Philosophy of Science 78, 2 
(2011): 303-324; Gillian Einstein, "Situated Neuroscience: Exploring. Biologies of Diversity," 
in Neurofeminism: Issues at the Intersection of Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science, eds. Robyn 
Bluhm, Anne Jaap Jacobson, and Heidi Lene Maibom (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 145-
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claim that non-epistemic values can legitimately play a direct role in the earlier 
stages of the scientific process, such as deciding which projects to pursue or how to 
fund them, but that they should have only an indirect role in the later stages, such 
as deciding which empirical claims to make.9 Others argue that because people are 
unavoidably situated in a particular social context, non-epistemic values may have a 
legitimate role in all stages of their research. On this approach, we should neither 
ignore nor proscribe the role of values, but instead embrace those values and manage 
them in ways that improve scientific practice.10  
Relatedly, science communication is rife with non-epistemic values that play 
a role in the uptake of scientific information. Some researchers argue that 
philosophical research on values in science largely ignores the important role that 
collaboration plays in the scientific process.11 Collaboration and communication 
between scientists, among scientific communities and, in some cases, relevant 
publics, often helps promote progress in science and philosophy of science.12 
Furthermore, research has shown that science communication and the uptake of 
information can be highly influenced by cultural predispositions.13 Therefore, the 
relationship between values in science and science communication warrants further 
investigation. 
This paper contributes to our understanding of these issues in a novel way, by 
using behavioural experimentation. We report results from three experiments 
                                                        
174. 
9 Heather Douglas, "Inductive Risk and Values in Science," Philosophy of science 67, 4 (2000): 559-
579; Heather Douglas, Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal (Pittburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2009); Heather Douglas, "The Role of Values in Expert Reasoning," Public Affairs 
Quarterly 22, 1 (2008): 1-18. 
10 Ingo Brigandt, "The Dynamics of Scientific Concepts: The Relevance of Epistemic Aims and 
Values," Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice 3 (2012): 75; Sarah S. Richardson, Sex Itself: 
The Search for Male and Female in the Human Genome (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2013); Daniel Steel and Kyle Powys Whyte, "Environmental Justice, Values, and Scientific 
Expertise," Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22, 2 (2012): 163-182. 
11 Kristina Rolin, "Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration," Philosophy of 
Science 82, 2 (2015): 157-177. 
12 Heather Douglas, "Inserting the Public Into Science," In Democratization of Expertise? 
Exploring Novel Forms of Scientific Advice in Political Decision-Making, eds. Sabine Maasen and 
Peter Weingart, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 153-169; Carla Fehr and Kathryn S. Plaisance, 
"Socially Relevant Philosophy of Science: An Introduction," Synthese 177, 3 (2010): 301-316. 
13 Dan M. Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith, and Donald Braman, "Cultural Cognition of Scientific 
Consensus," Journal of Risk Research 14, 2 (2011): 147-174. 
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testing judgments about the credibility of scientific research. More specifically, we 
tested whether such judgments were affected by three factors: whether scientists 
consult with non-scientists, whether scientists conduct research under a restrictive 
government communication policy, and the source of a lab’s funding. We found that 
each of these factors affected ordinary judgments about credibility. Our findings 
support several recommendations to improve science communication. 
Experiment 1 
Some social scientists and philosophers of science have argued that communication 
from relevant publics is a critical part of the scientific research process.14 In 
particular, some argue that relevant publics have knowledge that can help improve 
scientific research, and that communicating with these publics and learning from 
can improve scientific practice. However, it has also been argued that this part of the 
research process often gets overlooked and that scientists should pay more attention 
to it.15 
Our goal in this experiment was to test people’s judgments about the 
importance of consulting with relevant publics about scientific research. This 
experiment is modelled after a well-known case about a group of biologists in the 
United Kingdom who were studying the cause of high radiation levels found in lamb 
meat.16 These scientists were successful in their investigation only after consulting 
with sheep farmers in the area and learning about the sheep’s grazing and drinking 
patterns. Our research question asked whether consulting with a relevant public 
increases the perceived credibility of scientific research. 
                                                        
14 Karin Bäckstrand, "Civic Science for Sustainability: Reframing the Role of Experts, Policy-
Makers and Citizens in Environmental Governance," Global Environmental Politics 3, 4 (2003): 
24-41; Dan Kahan, "What is the 'Science of Science Communication'?" Journal of Science 
Communication 14, 03 (2015): 1-12; Kahan, Jenkins‐Smith, and Braman, "Cultural 
Cognition;" Douglas, "Inserting the Public;" Whyte and Crease, "Trust, Expertise," 411-425. 
15 Brian Wynne, "May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Reflexive View of the Expert–Lay Knowledge 
Divide," in Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology eds. Scott Lash, Bronislaw 
Szerszynski, and Brian Wynne (London: Sage, 1996): 44; Whyte and Crease, "Trust, Expertise," 
411-425; Heidi E. Grasswick, "Scientific and Lay Communities: Earning Epistemic Trust through 
Knowledge-Sharing," Synthese 177, 3 (2010): 387-409. 
16 Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne, eds. Misunderstanding Science?: The Public Reconstruction of 
Science and Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Wynne, "A Reflexive 
View," 44. 
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Method 
Participants 
One hundred forty-four participants were tested (aged 19-60, mean age = 32 years; 
57 female; 94% reporting English as a native language). Participants were U.S. 
residents, recruited and tested online using Amazon Mechanical Turk and Qualtrics, 
and compensated $0.35 for approximately 2 minutes of their time. The same 
recruitment and compensation procedures were used for all experiments reported in 
this paper. Repeat participation was prevented. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (Consultation: 
extensive/none) × 2 (Outcome: success/failure) between-subjects design. Each 
participant read one version of a story about scientists who are testing for radiation 
levels on sheep farms. The Consultation factor manipulated whether the scientists 
consulted with local sheep farmers before testing began. The Outcome factor 
manipulated whether the scientists ultimately discovered the radiation’s cause. We 
included the Outcome factor to detect whether lack of consultation affected 
credibility only when the scientists failed (i.e. whether there was a Consultation × 
Outcome interaction on credibility judgments). This is the story (with the 
manipulations separated by a slash in brackets): 
Dangerous radiation was recently found in the lamb meat from a certain country. 
A group of scientists were then sent to test the radiation levels on sheep farms in 
the area. Before the scientists began testing, they [consulted extensively/did not 
consult] with the local sheep farmers and so [did/didn’t] take into account their 
perspective on what happened to the sheep. After the testing was complete, the 
scientists [discovered/failed to discover] that the sheep were irradiated because 
they ate contaminated grass. 
After reading the story, participants rated their agreement or disagreement 
with the following statements: 
1. The scientists conducted the tests competently. 
2. The scientists were objective. 
3. The scientists are trustworthy. 
4. The scientists should have consulted more with the local sheep farmers. 
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Each statement appeared on a separate screen while the story remained atop 
the screen. The statements were always presented in the same order. Participants 
could not return to a previous screen to change an answer. Responses were collected 
using a standard 6-point likert scale, 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 6 (“strongly agree”). 
Participants then advanced to a new screen and answered a comprehension 
question from memory (response options rotated randomly): 
5. The scientists _____ with the local sheep farmers. [consulted 
extensively/did not consult] 
The correct response depended on the version of the story that the participant 
read. After testing, participants advanced to a new screen to complete brief 
demographic questionnaire. 
Results 
Ninety percent of participants (129 of 144) participants passed the comprehension 
check. We excluded from the analysis participants who failed, but including them 
results in the same basic pattern reported below. The same is true in all other 
experiments reported here. Preliminary regression analyses revealed that participant 
gender and age did not affect response to any of the dependent measures. The same 
is true for all the other experiments reported here. These demographic factors will 
not be discussed further. 
For the purposes of analyzing the results, we calculated a “credibility score” 
based on the first three probes, about competence, objectivity and trust. It is prima 
facie plausible that these probes measure the same conceptual variable, and 
responses to the probes were highly internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .858), 
strongly suggesting that they measure the same underlying construct. For each 
participant, their credibility score was the mean of their response to the three items. 
A univariate analysis of variance revealed that credibility score was affected 
by Consultation, F(1, 125) = 11.25, p = .001, ηp2 = .083, and by Outcome, F(1, 125) = 
47.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .277, but not by their interaction, p = .425, n.s. (See Fig. 1.) 
Follow-up independent samples t-tests compared credibility scores between the 
Consultation conditions for both the success and failure conditions. In success 
conditions, credibility scores were higher when the scientists consulted (N = 34, M= 
4.70, SD = 0.81) than when they did not consult (N = 31, M = 3.92, SD = 1.40), t(47.16) 
= 2.69, p = 0.10. The size of the mean difference was medium-to-large, MD = 0.78, 
95% CI [0.19, 1.35], d = 0.78. In failure conditions, credibility scores were higher 
when the scientists consulted (N = 29, M = 3.26, SD = 1.04) than when they did not 
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consult (N = 35, M = 2.79, SD = 0.89), t(62) = 1.95, p = .055. The size of the mean 
difference was medium, MD = 0.47, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.96], d = 0.50. 
 
Fig. 1. Mean credibility scores in the four conditions. The scale ran 1 (low) - 6 
(high). Error bars represent 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
A univariate analysis revealed that response to whether the scientists should 
have consulted more was affected by Consultation, F(1, 125) = 84.48, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.403, Outcome, F(1, 125) = 6.01, p = .016, ηp2 = .046, but not by their interaction, p 
= .544, n.s. Follow-up independent samples t-tests revealed that in both success and 
failure conditions, when the scientists did not consult the locals, participants were 
more likely to agree that the scientists should have consulted more with the locals: 
success conditions, none/extensive, M = 4.87/3.15, SD = 1.28, 1.02, t(63) = 6.02, p < 
.001, MD = 1.72, 95% CI [1.15, 2.30], d = 1.52 (very large effect size); failure 
conditions, M = 5.49/3.52, SD = 0.70/1.48, t(38.32) = 6.58, p < .001, MD = 1.97, 95% 
CI [1.36, 2.57], d = 2.13 (very large effect size). 
Discussion 
This experiment tested whether people’s judgments about trustworthiness, 
competence and objectivity were affected by a scientist’s willingness to consult with 
non-scientists with relevant expertise. We found that consultation significantly 
affected all three sorts of judgment. More specifically, we found that when scientists 
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consulted with relevant non-scientists about the research, participants perceived the 
scientists as more trustworthy, competent and objective. When scientists didn’t 
consult with others, participants perceived them as less trustworthy, competent and 
objective. This suggests an important practical lesson for scientists: building 
consultation with non-scientists into the research process can make research more 
credible. 
Having observed that scientists’ perceived credibility can be affected by 
whether they consult non-scientists, we next investigated another factor we thought 
might influence perceived credibility: the official communication policy in a 
scientist’s home nation. 
Experiment 2 
Researchers have recently criticized rules requiring government scientists to receive 
prior governmental approval before publishing research or communicating with 
journalists about findings.17 The criticisms have been based on general principles 
concerning the appropriate role of scientific research in modern democratic and 
industrialized societies. First, if the public is paying for research, then it should have 
access to the results. Second, if scientific communication is restricted, then relevant 
findings are less likely to inform policy decisions, thus degrading the quality of those 
decisions. Researchers argue that citizens should care about this because the 
consequences of restrictive communication policies can be, and already are, serious. 
Without in any way disputing the relevance and importance of these 
criticisms or arguments, we are interested in studying another dimension of this 
critical issue. It is possible that people tend to mistrust scientific research produced 
in a nation with restrictive rules about science communication. That is, even before 
the consequences of the restrictions are pointed out to them, people might mistrust 
scientific research conducted under such a regime. Mere awareness of the 
restrictions might diminish the perceived credibility of scientific research. We 
designed a second experiment to test this possibility. 
 
                                                        
17 Heather Douglas, "The Value of Cognitive Values," Philosophy of Science 80, 5 (2013): 796-806; 
Thomas Homer-Dixon, Heather Douglas, and Lucie Edwards, “Fix the Link Where Science and 
Policy Meet,” The Globe and Mail, June 23, 2014. 
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Method 
Participants 
One hundred forty new participants were tested (aged 18-68, mean age = 32 years; 
51 female; 96% reporting English as a native language). 
Materials and Procedure 
The testing procedures were basically the same as in Experiment 1. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (Policy: restrictive/unrestrictive) 
× 2 (Outcome: help/harm) between-subjects design. Each participant read a single 
version of a story about government-employed scientists trying to communicate the 
results of their research. The Policy factor manipulated whether the scientists 
worked in a country where government scientists are required to receive permission 
from the government before publicizing results. The Outcome factor manipulated 
whether the scientists concluded that a certain development would help or harm 
the environment. This is the story (with the manipulations separated by a slash in 
brackets): 
A corporation recently built a large facility near a major city. Scientists conducted 
tests around the facility, which suggest that its operation [helps/harms] the local 
environment. The scientists are currently writing up their conclusions. In their 
country, government scientists [are/are not] required to receive permission from 
the government before publishing papers or speaking to journalists about their 
research. 
After reading the story, participants responded to four test statements and a 
comprehension question in the exact same way as in Experiment 1: 
1. The scientists conducted the tests competently. 
2. The scientists were objective. 
3. The scientists are trustworthy. 
4. The scientists should have to receive government permission before 
publishing their results. 
5. In the country discussed, government scientists _____ required to receive 
permission before publishing results. [are/are not] 
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Results 
Ninety-four percent of participants (131 of 140) passed the comprehension check. 
We calculated a “credibility score” for each participant in the same way as in 
Experiment 1 (i.e. the mean of the first three probes, about competence, objectivity 
and trust). Responses to the three probes again formed a highly reliable scale 
(Cronbach’s α = .837). 
A univariate analysis of variance revealed that credibility score was affected 
by Policy, F(1, 127) = 8.42, p = .004, ηp2 = .062, but not by Outcome, p = .407, n.s., 
or their interaction, p = .254, n.s. (See Fig. 2.) A follow-up independent samples t-
test revealed that credibility scores were lower when the communication policy was 
restrictive (N = 66, M = 4.07, SD = 1.03) than when it was unrestrictive (N = 65, M = 
4.57, SD = 0.89), t(129) = -3.03, p = .003. The size of the mean difference was medium, 
MD = -0.51, 95% CI [-0.84, -0.17], d = 0.53. 
 
Fig. 2. Mean credibility scores when the communication policy was restrictive or 
unrestrictive (collapsing across good/bad outcome). The scale ran 1 (low) - 6 (high). 
Error bars represent 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
A univariate analysis revealed that response to whether scientists should have 
to receive government permission was unaffected by Policy, p = .110, n.s., Outcome, 
p = .752, n.s., or their interaction, p = .335, n.s. 
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Discussion 
This experiment tested whether people’s judgments about scientific credibility are 
affected by restrictive government policies for communicating scientific results. We 
found that restrictive policies diminished perceived credibility. More specifically, 
we found that when government scientists weren’t constrained by government 
policy and were able to communicate their findings to the public, people perceived 
scientific research as more credible. This suggests an important practical lessons for 
scientists: having restrictive policies in place that prevent or make it difficult for 
scientists to communicate their findings to the public makes research less credible. 
Being aware of this in the earlier stages of scientific practice may help scientists deal 
with the problems this poses for their research in the later stages. It also suggests 
that policy changes may be in order if the government wants to improve the 
credibility of government-funded science. 
Having observed that scientists’ perceived credibility can be affected by their 
government’s communication policies, we next investigated a third factor we 
thought might influence perceived credibility: government funding-cuts to 
important scientific research departments. 
Experiment 3 
Critics have recently suggested that government bodies are (at least in part) 
responsible for financially supporting various types of scientific research that is 
important to their development and prosperity. Moreover, they suggest that the 
government’s financial support is a crucial part of advancing science for individual 
research labs as well.18 In other words, government funding plays a large role in the 
advancement of scientific research both for the scientists and for society, and 
government funds can be a helpful indicator of socially relevant science.  
We are interested in studying the impact of government funding on the 
credibility of scientific research. For instance, it is possible that the source of a lab’s 
funding, in particular whether it receives government funds, can affect the 
perceived credibility of that research. We designed an experiment to test this 
possibility. 
 
                                                        
18 Homer-Dixon, Douglas, and Edwards, “Fix the Link.” 
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Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and forty-two new participants were tested (aged 18-65, mean age = 
32 years; 98 female; 94% reporting English as a native language). 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 3 (Funding Source: 
government/corporate/both) x 2 (Recommendation: change/no change) between-
subjects design. Each participant read a single version of a story about an 
independent meteorological lab conducting research about air traffic quality. The 
Funding factor manipulated whether the lab was funded by the government, a 
corporation, or both. The Recommendation factor manipulated whether the lab 
recommended no changes or major changes to current traffic infrastructure. This is 
the story (with the manipulations separated by a slash in brackets): 
Atmospheric Labs is a meteorological lab that studies how traffic patterns affect air 
quality. The lab has a contract to investigate high levels of air pollution in the 
country. Atmospheric Labs is funded by [the federal government/the corporation 
Fuel Inc./both the federal government and the corporation Fuel Inc.]. After 
conducting a series of tests, the lab’s scientists recommended [no changes at 
all/major changes] to the current traffic infrastructure. 
After reading the story, participants responded to four test statements and a 
comprehension question in the exact same way as in Experiments 1 and 2: 
1. The scientists conducted the tests competently. 
2. The scientists were objective. 
3. The scientists are trustworthy. 
4. The scientists’ recommendation should be implemented. 
5. Atmospheric Labs is funded by _______. [government funds/corporate 
funds/government and corporate funds]. 
Results 
Eighty-three percent of participants (202 of 242) passed the comprehension check. 
We calculated a “credibility score” for each participant in the same way as in 
Experiment 1 (i.e. the mean of the first three probes, about competence, objectivity 
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and trust). Responses to the three probes again formed a highly reliable scale 
(Cronbach’s α = .902). 
A univariate analysis of variance revealed that credibility score was affected 
by Funding, F(2, 196) = 8.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .077, and by Recommendation, F(1, 196) 
= 50.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .205, but not by their interaction, p = .524, n.s. (See Fig. 3.) 
We conducted a series of planned pairwise comparisons within each type of 
recommendation, using independent samples t-tests. When the lab recommended 
no changes, credibility scores did not differ between government funding (N = 39, 
M = 3.71, SD = 1.08) or dual government-corporate funding (N = 34, M = 3.37, SD = 
1.04), t(71) = 1.34, p = .182, n.s; credibility scores were higher for government 
funding than for corporate funding (N = 29, M = 2.91, SD = 1.17), t(66) = 2.92, p = 
.005, MD = 0.80, 95% CI [0.25, 1.35], d = 0.72 (medium effect size); and credibility 
scores were marginally higher for dual government-corporate funding than for 
corporate funding, t(61) = 1.66, p = .10, MD = 0.47, 95% CI [-0.09, 1.02], d = 0.43 
(small effect size). When the lab recommended changes, credibility scores did not 
differ between government funding (N = 38, M = 4.46, SD = 0.82) and dual 
government-corporate (N = 35, M = 4.47, SD = 0.67), t(71) = 0.01, p = .992, n.s.; 
credibility scores were higher for government funding than for corporate funding 
(N = 27, M = 3.94, SD = 0.84), t(63) = 2.52, p = .014, MD = 0.53, 95% CI [0.11, 0.94], 
d = 0.64 (medium effect size); credibility scores were higher for dual government-
corporate funding than form corporate funding, t(60) = 2.75, p = .008, MD = 0.53, 
95% CI [0.14, 0.91], d = 0.71 (medium effect size).  
 
Fig. 3. Panel A: Mean credibility scores in the six conditions. Panel B: mean 
agreement that the policy recommendation should be implemented. Scales ran 1 
(low) - 6 (high). Error bars represent 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
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A univariate analysis revealed that response to whether the lab’s 
recommendation should be implemented was affected by Funding, F(2, 196) = 6.47, 
p = .002, ηp2 = .062, and by Recommendation, F(1, 196) = 37.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .162, 
but not by their interaction, p = .399, n.s. Judgments about implementation were 
very strongly positively correlated with credibility scores, r = .842, n = 202, p < .001. 
Discussion 
This experiment tested whether people’s credibility judgments were affected by the 
source of a lab’s funding in three cases: government funding, corporate funding and 
a mixture of government and corporate funding. We found that the funding source 
affected credibility judgments. More specifically, we found that people view a lab as 
more credible when it receives government funding, regardless of whether the lab 
also receives corporate funding. When a lab received only corporate funding, it 
diminished the lab’s perceived credibility. 
General Discussion 
An important part of the scientific process is communicating results to interested 
publics. When scientific results are important for current policy debates and matters 
of public interest, perceptions of scientific credibility will affect public uptake of 
science. Nowhere is this more evident than in the recent controversies over the 
status of evolutionary theory in the science curriculum and the safety of childhood 
vaccines. It is no surprise, then, that researchers have begun considering the role 
that values play in the perceived credibility of scientific research and the 
effectiveness of science communication. For example, some researchers have 
recently argued that scientific results should be communicated with complete 
transparency about the values and background assumptions underlying the research, 
in an effort to promote trust and effective uptake.19 This is part of an important 
recent discussion, in science studies and the philosophy of science, about the role 
that values do and should play in scientific research.20 
                                                        
19 Elliott and Resnik, "Science, Policy, and the Transparency of Values," 647-650. 
20 Anderson, “Uses of Value Judgments in Science,” 1-24; Brigandt, "The Dynamics of Scientific 
Concepts," 75; Douglas, "Inductive Risk," 559-579; Douglas, "The Role of Values," 1-18; 
Douglas, Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal; Einstein, "Situated Neuroscience," 145-174; 
Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Helen Longino, The Fate of Knowledge (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002); Helen E. Longino, Studying Human Behavior: How Scientists 
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In this paper we reported the results of three experiments testing people’s 
judgments of scientific credibility. More specifically, we tested judgments about the 
trustworthiness, competence and objectivity of scientists and their research. We 
tested whether these judgments were affected by three factors: whether scientists 
consulted with non-scientists, whether scientists conducted research under a 
restrictive government communication policy, and the source of the lab’s funding 
(government funding, private funding, or a combination of both). We found that 
perceived scientific credibility was increased by consulting with non-scientists 
(Experiment 1), by working in a nation with unrestrictive science communication 
policies (Experiment 2), and by receiving government funding (Experiment 3). We 
also found that perceived credibility was, unsurprisingly, strongly positively 
correlated with people’s willingness to support a policy recommended by scientists 
(Experiment 3). 
These findings suggest some recommendations for scientists interested in 
communicating their research to the public, or having their research affect debates 
or public policy. First, when feasible, scientists could build into their research 
programs consultation with interested non-scientists. For instance, a lab working to 
develop a vaccine could consult with local parent associations and inquire into 
concerns that parents might have about vaccines. Then, when communicating the 
results, the lab can report that parents were consulted and explain how the research 
directly addresses those concerns. Second, scientists could, either individually or 
through their professional associations, advocate for unrestrictive government 
communication policies for scientific research. Our findings suggest that a scientist’s 
credibility can be affected by simply living and working in a country whose 
government imposes prior restrictions on scientific communication. This should be 
alarming to all scientists. Indeed, as the recent uproar in Canada over the Harper 
administration’s science communication policy shows, retrograde communication 
policies can suddenly afflict even advanced democratic societies.21 Third, scientists 
should keep in mind the potential cost in credibility of restricting themselves to 
private funding for their research, because receiving government funding increases 
a scientist’s credibility. To increase the perceived credibility of their research, they 
could seek support from government agencies and grant sources. 
                                                        
Investigate Aggression and Sexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Richardson, Sex 
Itself; Whyte and Crease, "Trust, Expertise," 411-425. 
21 Homer-Dixon, Douglas, and Edwards, “Fix the Link.” 
Janet Michaud and John Turri  
214 
Future work on this set of issues could take many directions, in addition to 
investigating limitations or weaknesses in any of the findings reported here. One 
direction is to explore the effect of other factors on people’s credibility judgments. 
For instance, perhaps having a demographically and epistemically diverse research 
team or working in a nation that has recently cut funding for scientific research 
affects perceived credibility. Another direction is to investigate credibility 
judgments among more specific populations. Although public uptake of science is a 
worthy goal and, in many cases, integral to a research team’s mission, it is not always 
a goal. But scientists are almost always concerned with communicating their results 
to other scientists, either for publication or for securing funding. It is an open 
question whether the same factors that affect ordinary people’s credibility judgments 
also affect professional scientists’ credibility judgments. Accordingly, it would be 
worth exploring investigating these same questions among a population of scientists. 
Finally, whereas we investigated these issues by having people read information 
about scientific research, different factors might be relevant for assessing the 
credibility of scientific research communicated in other media, such as radio, 
podcasts, or television.22,23 
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